Saturday, 15 November 2025

One Hour Drop Too Far, Arnhem 17th September 1944

 As it was September I wanted to run an Arnhem scenario. I'd done quite a few during lockdown using NATO Brigade Commander, but this particular one I'd only run at the Sheffield club some years ago using John As 'Battlegroup' rules so I thought it was suitable for the One Hour WW2 treatment. The original scenario is from the Command Decision Scenario book 'Market Garden' and its full title is 'A Drop Too Far, or a drop too far from the bridge?'. It covers 1st Airborne Brigade on the afternoon of 17th September 1944.


Battlefield from the south, you can see it is heavily wooded. I've cycled along the airborne route to Arnhem and it gives you a good feel for the terrain.   Oosterbeek is in the bottom right, Wolfheze station top left on the railway line and the Hartenstein Hotel is right in the middle just south of the railway next to a T junction. The grey road at the bottom is the main road to Utrecht (Utrechtsweg) and the one at the top right is the main road ot Amsterdam (Amsterdamweg). Deelen Airfield is off to the northeast and Arnhem itself is off to the east. There are five objective locations, Wolfheze, the road exit down the Amsterdamweg, two hexes in Oosterbeek and the Hartenstein. The British need to capture four to win.


Sadly for the British Kraffts 16th SS Training Battalion is in the way. I've used the scenario setup, but irl one of these companies was further south. 4 Ko is at Hartenstein accompained by an SP Flak platoon, 9 Ko is at Vallenburg on the west side of Osterbeek with the mighty battalion AT platoon (Pak 36!) and the battalion mortar platoon provides indirect fire support. I'm using company sized elements for this. 

There is a destroyed German artillery park burning northeast of the Hartenstein.  John B and Russell are commanding the Germans, with Tim joining. on Tuesday. This game attracted an insane number of players for a remote game, but I wanted to keep the Germans as a tight team with just a couple of commanders.


Up at Wolfheze, 2nd Ko is dug in accompanied by the engineer platoon. Historically these are the guys who ambushed Goughs 1st recce squadron. I'm going to deploy all the German starting forces as hidden, as the 1st Airborne Brigade didn't have a clue they were there although the South Staffs had already skirmished with them.

West of Wolfheze Station is a burning Flak train, destroyed by the RAF. There also various Dutch civilians lurking in the woods, including some escaped patients from the nearby psychiatric asylum.


Up on the Amsterdamweg, 9th SS recce battalion already has armoured car patrols motoring up and down the highway. The 9th SS response was so fast that these guys were deployed before 1st Airborne Brigade had even moved off its DZ. They spent some time motoring up and down here unable to find any British paras, and then motored off to Nijmegen to try and find anyone down there, crossing the Arnhem bridge before 2nd Bn got there. Thanks to the crazy assignment of priorities in the 82nd Airborne sector (just one company assigned to take Nijmegen Bridge), they didn't find any US paras in Nijmegen either.

The South Staffs noticed the German armour on the main road and actually sent a fairly decent sighting report of '20 tanks and halftracks' on the main road, but it never made it to 1st Para Brigade.


On the way are the immediate reinforcements, KG Weber, a bunch of Luftwaffe signallers handed rifles and sent south and KG von Allworden, the 9th SS Panzerjaeger battalion. KG Weber aren't very good and I'm treating them as raw light infantry (so 1D6 at long range) as they haven't got any heavy weapons. KG von Allworden are a different matter, these are veteran SS troops with a company or so of dismounted panzerjager crews operating as infantry and the only actually functional fully tracked AFVs possessed by 9th SS, a pair of Jagdpanzer IVs. 9th SS may have also had a pair of Panthers, accounts vary. The Jagdpanzers should be L48s but I only have L70s, and I'm assuming some SP Flak is with them too as some SPAA guns were in action very quickly. The British reported these as Stugs or 'SP guns'.

irl these guys were in a blocking position on the Amsterdamweg north of Oosterbeek long before the Paras even got marching, but for game balance reasons, they rock up on turn 6.

The Germans threw more and more troops from 9th SS into this blocking detachment overnight, as they mobilised including at least a dozen SP Flak guns and two battalions of artillery crews fighting as infantry, eventually becoming KG Spindler under the 9th SS Artillery Regiment CO.


The top left of the battlefield is part of the 1st Airlanding Brigade LZ, so there are a few gliders scattered around. 1st Airlanding dropped closer to Arnhem where the terrain was better for gliders, but had the job of securing the LZs. There are a couple of platoons from the South Staffs in the woods staking out a perimeter and a small group of Germans on bicycles checking out the gliders. Well, they did say there would just be old men and bicycles at Arnhem. 


And here is 1st Airborne Brigade. 1st and 3rd Battalions anyway. 2nd  Battalion is down on the river road. All the Para units are rated as Veterans. John A is overall commander. I had loads and loads of players so I gave most of them to the British to reflect the breakdown of communications and the very hesitant British advance.


First up we have Freddie Goughs 1st Airborne Recce Squadron. Despite what Cornelius Ryan said, most of the jeeps survived the landing and they formed up to lead the coup de main via Wolfheze and then into Arnhem. John will run Gough along with the brigade.

Behind them coming up the road to Wolfheze we have 1st Para Bn with three rifle companies, one of which is accompanied by engineers and the other by the battalion MG/Mortar platoon. Jerry and Michael are running these, with Michael being replaced by Jim on Wednesday and Ian joining in too.


Behind them we have 3rd Battalion, run by Pete and Simon. One company is accompanied by towed 6pdrs and the other by the MG/Mortar platoon. They enter in the northwest corner over the LZ.

In support we have two batteries of pack 75mm guns from 1st Royal Airlanding Artillery Regiment and a couple of jeeps towing supplies. The guns have three fire missions each. There are also figures for Brigadier Lathbury and General Urquhart, who may roll up at some point. The British have comms problems so messages only get through on a 3+.


And of course we have fleets of aircraft. The Dakotas are just for fun but I'm allowing the British to have RAF interdiction strikes on the German logistics even though the main wave of raids is over. They will get a good chance of one strike per turn, either of B-25s or Mosquitos.

So, to battle....


Goughs Jeeps rolled up the road to Wolfheze passing cheering crowds of Dutch civilians. They were flagged down by some South Staffs who vaguely indicated that there were 'some Germans down the road', but they pressed on to Wolfheze Station. 1st Para marched in column behind them.

3rd Para marched on across the LZ, past odd figures in robes in the woods. The Germans on bicycles inspecting the gliders ran away, but the paras ran onto some more South Staffs who reported 'at least 20 German tanks and armoured cars on the main road'. Nothing was in sight however.


All hell then broke loose as 2/16th SS spring their trap. Mortar bombs, MG fire and even flamethrowers tore into Goughs jeeps. Even worse, 4/16th SS with their SP Flak opened up on them from the Hartenstein. Gough took enough damage to become disorganised.


The British response was swift and brutal. Gough withdrew into the woods south of the railway to reorganise, while the leading companies of 1st Para shook out into combat formation. 2/16th SS was plastered with 75mm artillery fire and suppressed. The German return fire suppressed B/1 Para but was otherwise fairly ineffective. 3rd Para meanwhile marched across the heathland towards the Amsterdamweg, undeterred by tales of German armour.


The combat debut of my Mosquito! It rolled up and strafed the German logistics units, carefully avoiding the ambulance. 


Every single available British unit opened up on 2/16th SS, including most of 3rd Para. This was enough to disorganise them and the Germans wisely fell back down the track to some woods. Krafft called up his 9th company to support 4/16 SS at Hartenstein but otherwise there was something of a lull in the German fire as the Germans resupplied their mortars. Some German armoured cars appeared on the Amsterdamweg and motored off into the distance. They didn't seem overly bothered by the Paras milling around the gliders.


With Wolfheze clear, Gough was able to get his reorganised Jeeps under the railway embankment and north of the railway. 3rd Para resumed their march eastwards and made it onto the Amsterdamweg, just as KG Weber appeared and blocked the highway. 1st Para redeployed to attack the Hartenstein but took heavy fire from Kraffts 4th and 9th companies. In turn the British artillery shelled the hotel and grounds. 2/16th SS was well out of harms way and reorganised.


Next turn saw a general British advance. 3rd Para deployed to attack KG Weber. Gough pushed his Jeeps up to recce 2/16th SS. 1st Para lined up to attack Hartenstein and the combination of small arms and artillery fire was enough to disorganise 4/16th SS. It turned out I'd made a mistake in the briefings and got 1st and 3rd Para mixed up in terms of unit objectives, but a conference between Gough, Fitch and Dobie sorted it out and everyone set off in the correct directions. 


The reorganised 2/16th SS shot up Goughs jeeps again, but to far less effect this time. 4/16th SS fell back down the road to Oosterbeek covered by 9/16th SS.


In the north 3rd Para laid down a hail of fire on KG Weber, enough to disorganise it, followed up by a charge by A/3 Para which was enough to rout the hastily armed Luftwaffe signallers.


2/16th SS had also taken a battering and fell back disorganised towards Hejendal. In the nick of time however, KG von Allworden (9th SS Panzerjaeger battalion) turned up and blocked the main road.


Meanwhile 1st Para took the Hartenstein as 4/16th SS reorganised. A/1 Para was badly shot up as it tried to attack 9/16th SS over open ground and became disorganised. At the end of turn 6, the British are are actually making decent progress towards their objectives and have captured two of the four required.

We broke for the evening there and would resume operations the following day.

A bit of a personnel change on Wednesday, Micheal had to leave us but we were joined by Tim, Ian and Jim. Pete was also having persistent wifi problems so I had a bit of a rejig of the British. Simon, Ian and Pete ran 3rd Para while Jerry and Jim took 1st Para. John B stepped back to overall command of the Germans so Tim took over 4/16 SS and 9/16 SS while Russell had 2/16 SS and KG von Allworden.


2/16th was first victim, already disorganised and left in the open west of Hejendal, concentrated fire  from 1st Recce Squadron, 3rd Para and 1st Airborne artillery sent them back to reorganise further east and they vanished from the table.


4/16 SS and 9/16 SS continued their fighting withdrawal into Oosterbeek covered by the 120mm mortars. The dense terrain frustrated the British efforts to concentrate fire on them, and the British kept taking losses and having to stop to reorganise. They kept up a steady pressure on the SS however who could never quite muster the firepower to actually eliminate a unit.

There was an exciting interlude when General Kussin, commander of the Arnhem garrison, motored down the road right into the Paras and was duly machinegunned in his car. Various gruesome pictures of him hanging out of the door are in Ryans' Bridge Too Far'.


In the north the whole of 3rd Para was deployed now as well as 1s Recce. KG von Allworder didn't fancy the odds and fell back to the woods south of Hejendal carrying a couple of hits.


Back in Oosterbeek 9/16 SS fell back in disorder but 4/16 SS shot up C/1st Para quite badly and they became disorganised. B/3rd Para infiltrated down the railway line to the underpass.


To everyones amazement, massed fire from 3rd Para and 1st Recce (plus the divisional artillery) convinced KG von Allworden to head for home, leaving their Jagdpanzers behind. The British did roll four 5s and 6s on their combat dice, so they were somewhat fortunate. The German northern flank had completely collapsed and B/3 Para advanced into the vacuum. Brigadier Lathbury had meanwhile turned up at 3rd Para HQ asking what was going on.


Meanwhile back in Oosterbeek 16th SS were hanging on by the skin of their teeth. The British reorganised C/1st Para covered by A/1st Para but B/1st Para was very badly shot up by 4/16th SS. It was reduced to a single hit and became (very) disorganised. 


3rd Para and 1st Recce took Hejendal and set off to capture Oosterbeek Station, which would open a road route into Arnhem (the Amsterdamweg being thoroughly blocked by offtable German units by now). The marching columns looked rather grand! Lathbury had been joined by General Urquarrt himself, equally bemused by the situation. Later both senior officers would become cut off in the western outskirts of Arnhem, leaving 1st Para Brigade and 1st Airborne Division leaderless. Lathbury was seriously wounded escaping the encirclement.


16th SS were doing a good job holding off 1st Para, but the British superiority of numbers and (at this stage of the battle) logistics was beginning to tell. 1st Airborne arty stonked 4/16th SS who fell back to reorganise.  


By now 3rd Para was entering the fray from the northeast and the British communications were obviously working well for a change as once more they called down a devastating stonk on 9/16 SS who fell back to avoid encirclement. The German ambulances (fortunately spared from repeated bombing raids) were kept very busy. It was a case of Festung Oosterbeek now.


Outnumbered 3:1 it was just a case of time though, and as the Railway Bridge exploded down by the Rhine, 9/16th SS melted away and 4/16th SS became disorganised. The British held four objectives and there was no hope of the Germans retaking one in the last two turns so we called it there with a British victory!

Historically 1st Recce never really recovered from the initial ambush at Wolfheze, while 3rd Para got stuck on the northern outskirts of Oosterbeek although they did manage to infiltrate a company down the railway line to the bridge. So well done to the British, they did rather better than historically despite wrestling with bad comms difficult terrain and a lot of ground to cover. The Germans also managed to conduct that hardest of military operations and wargames, a fighting retreat, very effectively and they were perhaps let down by some hot British dice in the last few turns.  

That was quite hard work to run due to the number of players, but despite some confusion it seemed to go well and we reached a conclusion with time to spare, something I was doubtful of after Tuesday evening. Many thanks to players for making it such an enjoyable game and taking part with such enthusiasm. Excellent job on the hats everyone!

 








23 comments:

  1. Really interesting write-up. Arnhem is endlessly fascinating from a gaming POV! Did I understand correctly that the Germans started off with 16 SS Trg Bn units hidden, but everyone else is on the table?

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    1. Thank you. Yes, Arnhem is the campaign which just keeps on giving and it seems to be endlessly popular with players too. I've run or played in the entire campaign with figures on six occasions now, and I've lost count of the more tactical actions and board and computer games.

      I usually play remote games with everything on the table as it is hard enough for players to see what is going on anyway. But for this one I started the the 16th SS hidden, revealed if they moved or fired. As everyone else came marching on, they were all revealed at once. I had a stack of pre programmed events too - General Kussin etc

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  2. Sounds like an excellent game. What was the total playing time?

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    1. The usual, two evenings of one hour fifteen minutes each. There was a lot of chit chat and back and forth, so it wasn't quite enough but we'd reached an obvious conclusion if not the last turn. I find the One Hour WW2 games play faster f2f as players can just move their own stuff instead of asking me to do it.

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  3. My goodness, what a great game, thanks for sharing, Martin! I love seeing the grand sweep of the action, brigade vs brigade, it's magnificent, and despite my current infatuation with platoon-level gaming, I haven't forgotten this level of gaming and, of course, you're inspiring me to get back to at it sooner rather than later.

    I'm not nearly as familiar with the OOB as you, and so when you wrote that 9/16 SS was backed by the AT platoon of Pak-36, I figured you'd made a mistake, surely you meant Flak-36, then I zoomed and took a good look, and there it was, a little 37mm ATG! I assume they had these because they were simply a training battalion? It's surprising to see them at this late stage of the war, when they were already deemed in 1940/41 as not being particularly effective (not sure if it's accurate or not, but I recall now seeing an FJ unit Pak-36 fire a 'stielgranate' in the fighting in Caen in Band of Brothers).

    Again, thank you for al the work to put that on and share it, I very much appreciate it.

    V/R,
    Jack

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    1. Thank you, I'm glad you enjoyed it as it was lots of fun to put on.

      Yes, the 16th SS training battalion had a rather unusual OB, mainly the heavy weapons company with included Flak, engineers and an anti tank gun platoon with Pak 36. I assume the mixture was for familiarisation with employment of particular types of weapons, if not the most up to date models. 16th "Reichsfuhrer SS' Division was actually stationed in Italy.

      Training unit units often had older equipment, for obvious reasons, but there were still some older AT guns knocking around in some infantry division regimental AT companies.

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    2. The Pak 36 was obsolete by 1944, but it could be used against light armour, had a marginally useful HE round and the Steilgranate gave it a greater AT capability at short range. Very light and easy to move and conceal though.

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    3. Thanks for the info, Martin! I’m not at all familiar with 16th SS Division, can’t say I’ve ever heard of them.

      And very interesting that Pak-36s still existed this late in the war, outside training units. Even a Sherman would be fairly invulnerable, I’d imagine, much less taking on a Churchill or any of the late war Soviet monsters! And even regarding HE, I’ve personally used 40mm HE and it’s by no means useless, it’s hard for me to contextualize it, like why would German industry even continue turning out 37mm HE rounds when there are a plethora of 75mm and 150mm infantry guns, and 80mm and 120mm mortars (to whit, the 50mm mortar is pretty much long gone at this point, though I do recall reading 12th SS used them in Normandy, so who knows!)?

      On a side note (and I don’t mean to butt in, nor do I mean any disrespect to Mr Patterson), below there is a comment about a large portion of British 1st Airborne Division losing cohesion and very quickly becoming combat ineffective. I may be misunderstanding Mr Patterson’s point, but I’ve never really read or heard anything about 1st AB Div performing poorly at Arnhem.

      My understanding is that it was a flawed plan (dropping so far from the objectives) and the German response was much faster/aggressive than anyone foresaw, but that ultimately failure to reach the objectives (in force) was down to foot mobile, lightly armed paras being no match for any sort of gathering of heavy weapons (armored recon, assault gun, self propelled AAA) thrown at them, but that ultimately it was unit cohesion/esprit de corps that allowed the paras to perform so tenaciously for so long in the face of such overwhelming numbers and firepower.

      So I say all that to say, I’m very much looking forward to your response to Mr Patterson, and expect to learn quite a bit from it!

      V/R,
      Jack

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    4. Even the 1st AB commanders at the time complained at the inordinate amount of time it took for the para units to mount and complete attacks. The individual subunits were cohesive (as their prolonged defence showed), but many of the higher units were untried and really didn't do very well in the attack.

      16th SS was one of the later SS divisions, it fought pretty well exclusively in Sicily and Italy and was organised as a Panzergrenadier division.

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    5. Martin,

      Ahh, so it was an issue of poor staff work, likely at battalion level, then? Couldn’t help that the CG and and a brigade commander were cut off and out of the loop ;)

      And what’s your take on how much comms was actually an issue for the Division? Of course the movie makes it seem like 1st AB suffered complete failure of all radio comms, but that’s not the sense I got from the book by Beevor.

      And very interesting, I had no idea there were SS units in Sicily, was just aware of HG and and FJ.

      As always, thank you for sharing!

      V/R,
      Jack

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    6. Yes, classic British Army, great units let down by poor planning although I wouldn't want to over emphasise that. At the end of the day, 1st Airborne Brigade did capture the bridge and held it for longer than required by the plan. The great tragedy was that the Germans recaptured it just as the Allies crossed the Maas in Nijmegen.

      I think the film had particular points it wanted to make, there was lots of stuff to fit into a movie format, and focusing on radios was perhaps shorthand for a more overall level of confusion.

      I've played the overall campaign many times in various formats, and the attack wasn't a terrible plan. With hindsight it obviously had flaws, but it is still winnable by the Allies, maybe 45/55. It doesn't meet the criteria of sound planning as taught at the Defence Academy (70/30 minimum) but I guess the coin toss aspect is what makes it so compelling. The campaign is almost always decided by the fighting around Nijmegen and how quickly the Allies can get across the Maas. If the 82nd can take Nijmegen bridge on Day 1 it is an almost certain Allied victory, but that is a tough assignment.

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    7. Martin,

      “At the end of the day, 1st Airborne Brigade did capture the bridge and held it for longer than required by the plan.”
      Indeed, lightly armed paratroopers seizing the bridge and holding out there and in Oosterbeek is quite the legendary feat of arms. I’d seen some complaints about other battalions’ inability to get through and reinforce Frost, but that doesn’t sit well with me; light infantry humping from distant drop zones through urban, unfamiliar terrain, vs their adversaries making the most of mechanization, terrain familiarity, and heavy weapons (AAA slaughtering troops from across the river stands out, off the top of my head).

      “I think the film had particular points it wanted to make, there was lots of stuff to fit into a movie format, and focusing on radios was perhaps shorthand for a more overall level of confusion.”
      That makes sense.

      “I've played the overall campaign many times in various formats, and the attack wasn't a terrible plan.”
      Beevor certainly loved pointing out that students at the Dutch military academy automatically failed the exercise if they tried to attack “up one road.” That seems rather simplistic and ignores the situation on the ground; you may want to attack from the north, but if you that’s not where you’re at it’s moot, no matter how perfect the plan might have been.

      “If the 82nd can take Nijmegen bridge on Day 1 it is an almost certain Allied victory, but that is a tough assignment.”
      I suppose it’s lost to time (as I understand it, contemporary accounts are vague and postwar accounts dodge the issue or seem self-serving), but I would love to have a time machine to be a fly on the wall to 1) hear what orders (exactly) were given to Gavin, and 2) absolutely more importantly, to hear Gavin’s deliberations with staff and final orders that resulted in seizure of a crossing apparently being put on the back burner. I’d love to hear the discussion between him, his staff, and his regimental commanders on what the priorities were and why. The most logical I’ve heard is being overly concerned with security on the flanks, though ‘most logical’ is relative, I.e., the best explanation for what happened, but still not the making any sense in terms of what should have happened, nor does it seem to make any sense from the point of view is a very experienced parachute infantry officer that should be used to grabbing key terrain and being surrounded/ignoring flanks after dropping into Sicily, Salerno, and Normandy…

      V/R,
      Jack

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    8. The 82nd had a really complex mission as they had several bridges to capture in their sector and I believe there was a great deal of concern about German attacks from the Reichswald (which did happen, but not with the German armoured support it was feared). With the benefit of hindsight, a full Para battalion instead of a company could probably have overcome the local bridge defence companies in Nijmegen on the 17th, but who knows.

      In free setup campaign games, I usually put the 82nd into Arnhem, 101st get Nijmegen and 1st Airborne get Eindhoven and the corridor. It just suits their characteristics and experience better, but I think that politically, it had to be British division across the Rhine.

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    9. Certainly, a tough situation to be sure, but I’d still love to sit in on those staff planning sessions to hear them discuss objectives, priorities, terrain appreciation, and threat ;)

      I know the major threat consideration was holding Groesboek Heights against threats emanating from Reichswald (to keep XXX Corps’ corridor open, as well as protect their DZs for follow-on troops and resupply; was there also threat concerns from the west, or was that only in 101st AB’s section?

      “It just suits their characteristics and experience better, but I think that politically, it had to be British division across the Rhine.”
      I understand the comment about Brit 1st AB having to be at the end of the line, and certainly 82nd AB is the most experienced (though not showing it in planning/emphasizing capture of Nijmegen road bridge), but what makes you want to change up the order of the drops? Do you figure Gavin would have won the fight about dropping closer to the bridge, or that 82nd AB would have done a better job reinforcing Frost at the bridge, or something else?

      Very interesting!

      V/R,
      Jack

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  4. That was a very well executed game giving a really good period / theatre / subject flavour. Your gaming calendar is impressively full at the moment :-)

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    1. Thank you. Yes, we certainly seem to have a lot on at the moment, but anything to do with Arnhem always attracts a lot of players. I like throwing in snippets of real events, and this particular engagement is certainly replete with those.

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  5. Interesting game Martin. The more I read about Arnhem, the more I'm wary of the way wargamers apply a blanket "Veteran" status to British Airborne. Frost's battalion clearly were but many while having high morale, were as a whole untried. I know individuals who dropped with 6th and wangled their way into 1st airborne, but these were rare. What strikes me was the speed with which unit cohesion fell apart. Yes there were communication problems, but it strikes me the minute they entered combat, lots of units became ineffective very quickly. I think it's a good argument for separating training/experience and morale.
    Neil

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    1. Well, I think it depends more on what you mean by the statuses. For this one my categories are pretty broad brush, but the net effect is to make individual subunits quite robust, but overall cohesion poor (by having so many British players), which I think reflects their performance in the first couple of days.

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    2. Apologies for delay in replying - google only lets me comment on your blog from the PC not tablet.
      To address my remarks. Firstly, this has nothing to do with morale which seems to have been high throughout the division.
      "Cohesion" as I define it, is the ability of a unit to continue to function, despite casualties, disorder and other such factors.
      There is a lot of evidence that very few men fight and motivate the many - a "core" if you will.
      Cohesion comes from training and experience, the more you do things, generally the better you get.
      So why pick on 1AB? Well, many wargamers automatically assign a "veteran" status to all units in the division; this usually carries combat bonuses. Lots of games end up with the British sweeping all before them without a great deal of effort. Look for example at the Rapid Fire refights, but also many others.
      The reality seems to have been different. Lots of units in the division had seen very little actual combat - landings in Italy being unopposed for example; many were infantry converted to airborne.
      What strikes me, is that much of the German opposition was decidedly inferior, some units being cobbled together from Luftwaffe, Navy and RAD with little if any actual combat experience.
      Why then do you see British units almost fall apart after brief engagements - I'm thinking here of the advance by Staffordshires and paras after Frost, the recce jeeps and the action around the cutting (Wolfheze?). Reading Middlebrook, it seems these units fragmented and the remnants were of limited combat value. Contrast with Frost. Same opposition including armour, yet they hold out for days. The only difference is experience. Hence my argument for separate training and morale and an avoidance of blanket veteran status.
      Unless of course you hold such sacred cows inviolate, in which case carry on...

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    3. I quite agree, I covered some of this in my replies to Jack. 1st Recce Squadron was a bit of a surprise, as they did actually see action in Sicily and Italy, quite a bit of it, but by Arnhem their CO (Douglas Firbank) had been transferred to 1st Airborne Army HQ and he was busy organising the defence of Brownings HQ. Firbank wrote an excellent memoir 'I Bought a Star'.

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  6. I looked up articles online on the lack of cohesion in 1AB's performance, with attacks going in piecemeal and breaking down quickly. In my -- obviously not particularly in-depth -- search, I learnt a few new things . (1) The "wrong crystals" looks to be a bit of a myth. It appears that only 2 sets with wrong crystals were delivered -- allocated to a US Air Support Signals Team; and a key problem for 1AB was untrained operators and the radio equipment being unable to be dismounted from their vehicles (and getting blown up). Urquhart seems to have perpetuated the "equipment" problem in his book. (2) The SOE operation from 1941 dropping agents and equipment in Holland to support Dutch resistance was compromised from the start by a double agent in Holland -- but SOE ignored prearranged warning codes in messages received and kept going, leading to the deaths of 50 agents. (3) After the failure was discovered, the British distrusted the Dutch resistance, so potentially valuable information was not available before or during Market -- 1AB was apparently ordered not to cooperate with the resistance!

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    1. There are so many myths around MG, it's difficult sometimes to identify what's true and what isn't.
      Post war, there was a decision taken at high levels to avoid blame. Hence the Official Histories published by the UK are often "bland", unlike the NZ and South African OH which are much more critical.
      MG has lots of "excuses" offered. The main flaw was the plan itself. Montgomery never understood armour and it seems he had as little idea of the problems pushing armour and support through narrow corridors at Alamein as he did at pushing it down one road. But, he surrounded himself with people who didn't argue back - if you did he got rid of you.
      Aside from Monty {who the more I read the more I dislike him} , the British suffered from absolutely appalling divisional and brigade commanders. Having just read a lot about the desert, it's clear the problems persisted right through the war. Egos clashed frequently to the detriment of plans and inexperienced divisional commanders spent time appeasing sub-commanders and holding committee meetings! You see this in 1 AB.
      It led (both in the desert and MG) with higher command running around trying to make sense of what was going on, at the risk of capture or worse. The resulting lack of command direction leads to chaos and/or inertia. Facing Germans with the doctrine of local commanders seizing the initiative, it was often disastrous.
      Neil

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    2. A lot of muddling through. Reading Correlli Barnett's take on Montgomery in "Desert Generals" and "The Battle of El Alamein" were real eye openers for me -- cutting through the propaganda and accepted history. And the treatment of Auchinleck by Churchill -- and the later lies from Montgomery -- was a travesty. Auchinleck was the real hero.

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